BYU Law Review
Volume 1978 | Issue 4

Article 2

11-1-1978

Burden of Proof in Racial Discrimination Actions
Brought Under the Civil Rights Acts of 1886 and
1870: Disproportionate Impact or Discriminatory
Purpose?

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
Recommended Citation
Burden of Proof in Racial Discrimination Actions Brought Under the Civil Rights Acts of 1886 and 1870: Disproportionate Impact or
Discriminatory Purpose?, 1978 BYU L. Rev. 1030 (1978).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1978/iss4/2

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Burden of Proof in Racial Discrimination Actions
Brought Under the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and
1870: Disproportionate Impact or Discriminatory
Purpose?
Competing notions about the meaning of equality have increasingly polarized the civil rights enforcement effort.' In spite
of the "difficulty of the issue[^],"^ the Supreme Court will continue the debate over equality this term.3 One of the issues confronting the Court in County of Los Angeles v. Davis4 involves
allocation of the burden of proof in actions brought under the
Civil Rights Acts of 18665and 1870:% the plaintiffs initial burl. Professor Brest notes that the "policy of the 1960's provided common ground for
persons having divergent aims. Disappointment with its results exposed latent differences
and eroded the coalition that had been responsible for much of the earlier progess in civil
rights." Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1976). For a discussion of the "latent [policyl
differences" that contributed to the polarization of the civil rights movement, see id. a t
2-3.
For a historical overview of civil rights enforcement efforts since the Civil War, see
R. CARR,FEDERAL
PROTECTION
OF CIVILRIGHTS:QUEST
FOR A SWORD
(1947); CIVILRIGHTS
AND THE AMERICAN
NEGRO
(A. Blaustein & R. Zangrando ed. 1968);N. GLAZER,
AFFIRMATIVE
DISCRIMINATION:
ETHNICINEQUALITY
AND PUBLIC
POLICY(1975); L. GRAGLU,
DISASTER
BY
DECREE(1976); R. KLUGER,
SIMPLEJUSTICE(1976); M.KONVITZ
& T. LESKES,A CENTURY
OF CIVILRIGHTS
(1961). A good bibliographic note on the race problem appears in H.
ABRAHAM,
FREEDOM
AND THE COURT
447-48 (1977).
2. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2766 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting). Justice Brennan had specific reference to affirmative
action, an issue closely related to the subject matter of this Comment.
Professor Brest has noted that
[off the civil rights issues that have emerged during the past decade, two of
the most controversial and important involve the propriety of granting racial
preferences to traditionally disadvantaged minorities and the operational relevance of the fact that a color-blind practice has a disproportionate adverse impact on the members of a racial minority group.
Brest, supra note 1, at 4-5. Affirmative action and disproportionate impact analyses are
related not only because of their importance to discrimination law, but because they seek
to implement similar values. See Brest, supra note 1, passim; Comment, Proof of Racially
Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburgh, 12 HARV.C.R.X.L.L. REV. 725, 727-30
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Proof of Purpose].
3. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Weber, 47 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Dec. 12,
1978) (No. 78-435), granting cert. to 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977); County of Los Angeles
v. Davis, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978) (No. 77-1553), granting cert. to 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir.
1977).
4. 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978) (No. 77-1553), granting cert. to 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977).
5. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
6. Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140'(1870).
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den of proof satisfied when it is established "that a color-blind
practice has a disproportionate adverse impact on the members
of a racial minority group"?' The issue is particularly important
in view of the expansive interpretations the early civil rights enactments have been given over the past decade? Unhampered by
many of the restrictive substantive and procedural limitations of
other civil rights measure^,^ 42 U.S.C. 9 8 19811°and 1982,'l which
7. Brest, supra note 1, a t 4-5.
8. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (Civil Rights
Act of 1866 forbids discrimination a g a i n ~ twhites as well as nonwhites); Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibits discrimination in private, nonsectarian schools); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975)
(Civil Rights Act of 1866 reaches private discrimination); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973) (private swimming club's discriminatory guest policy invalidated under Acts of 1866 and 1870); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396
U S . 229 (1969) (Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibits private recreational association from
discriminatorily withholding membership conveyed incident to a lease); Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibits private discrimination in the sale or rental of property).
Commentators have discussed extensively the "rediscovery" and subsequent judicial
development of the early civil rights enactments. See, e.g., Larson, The Development of
Section I981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HARV.
C.R.-C.L.L. REV.56, 59-67 (1972); Note, Racially Disproportionate Impact of Facially
Neutral Practices- What Approach Under 42 U.S. C. Sections 1981 and 1982?, 1977 DUKE
L.J. 1267, 1274-78 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Disproportionate Impact]; Note, Section
1981 and Private Discrimination: An Historical Justification for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO.
WASH.
L. REV.1024, 1035-43(1972); Note, The Expanding Scope of Section 1981: Assault
on Private Discrimination and a Cloud on Affirmative Action, 90 HARV.L. REV.412, 41233 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Expanding Scope]; Comment, A Prohibition Against
Private Discrimination: Section 1981, 14 IDAHOL. REV.677 (1978); Comment, Private
Discriminations Under the 1866 Civil Rights Act: In Search of Principled Constitutional
and Policy Limits, 7 U. TOL.L. REV. 139, 149-72 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Private
Discriminations]; Comment, Racial Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.615, 615-21 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Racial
Discrimination in Employment].
Justice Powell recognized the difficulty of limiting the scope of the 1866 Civil Rights
Act in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. at 186-88 (Powell, J., concurring). See also id. at 212
(White, J., dissenting) (admission standards of "[s]ocial clubs, black and white, and
associations designed to further the interests of blacks or whites" might be challenged
under the 1866 Act).
9. For example, unlike the Reconstruction Acts, title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 4 2000e to 2000e-17 (l976), does not cover employers engaging fewer than
15 employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, bona fide private membership clubs, Indian tribes, and the
United States Government. Id. § 2000e (b). Religious groups employing individuals in
religion-oriented work are also exempted. Id. § 2000e-1. See also Johnson v. Alexander,
572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1978) (Armed Forces not an "employer" for purposes of title VTI;
case was heard under Civil Rights Act of 1866).
Unlike the 19th-century legislation, the Fair Housing Act, title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. $8 3601-3619 (1976), does not cover in certain circumstances the
sale or rental of single-family dwellings by a private, individual owner. Id. § 3603(b). Title
VIII also exempts room rentals to religious or private groups. Id. $ 3607.
Procedural prerequisites and substantive remedies under titles VII and Vm are less
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are derived from the Reconstruction civil rights a~ts,~Qotentially
reach discriminatory conduct not covered by any other statutory
or constitutional provision.I3
In Washington v. Davis,I4 a decision that, according to one
commentator, "began a new era in civil rights law,"I5 the Supreme Court held that a more stringent standard of proof was
required in neutral factor cases brought under the fourteenth
amendment than in cases arising under title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.16Under the Constitution, plaintiffs must provide evidence of discriminatory intent." Under title VII, evidence
of a disproportionate racial impact is sufficient to establish a
prima facie case? The lower courts have divided on whether to
align the 1866 and 1870 Acts with the constitutional standard or
with the title VII standard.lg
This Comment will compare the origin and development of
the two principal evidentiary theories, discriminatory purpose
and disproportionate impact. The response of the lower courts to
Washington v. Davis in cases brought under the Civil Rights Acts
of 1866 and 1870 will be discussed, and the legal arguments for
and against aligning the Reconstruction Acts with the fourteenth
amendment standard will be analyzed. Finally, the conflicting
favorable than similar provisions under the 19th-century Acts. See Greenfield & Kates,
Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 CALIF.
L. REV.662, 665 & n.19 (1975).
10. 42 U.S.C. 8 1981 (1976), entitled "Equal rights under the law," states that:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976),entitled "Property rights of citizens," provides that: "All
citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property."
12. For an analysis of the historical link between $4 1981 and 1982 and the Civil
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870, see note 94 infra.
13. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) ( 5 1982 applies to private
as well as governmental conduct); Comment, Civil Rights-42 U.S.C. $ 1981: Keeping a
Compromised Promise of Equality to Blacks, 29 U . FLA.L. REV.318, 321 & n.27 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Promise of Equality].
14. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
15. Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory
Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961, 961.
16. 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
17. 426 U.S. a t 239, 244-45.
18. Id. a t 246-47.
19. See notes 58-72 and accompanying text infra.
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notions of equality that underlie the two theories will be compared in order to determine the appropriate evidentiary standard
for section 1981 and 1982 actions.

Discriminatory motivation has long been a. key element in
establishing a cause of action in race discrimination law." Because the early cases brought under the Fteconstruction amendments2' and Enforcement Actsn involved blatantly discrimina20. According to Professor Brest, "[tlhe Court's entire line of civil rights precedent,
beginning in 1879 with Strauder v. West Virginia, [I00 U.S. 303 (1880),] explicitly turns
on the race-dependence of the practices invalidated." Brest, supra note 1, at 27 (footnote
omitted). See also Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP.CT. REV. 95, 99-102. But see Ely, Legislative and
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALEL.J. 1205, 1208-09 (1970).
21. The thirteenth amendment declares that
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONST.amend. XIII.
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides in part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
Section 5 of the amendment empowers Congress to "enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article." The fifteenth amendment states:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
Id. amend. XV.
22. Seven civil rights acts were passed by Congress during the Reconstruction period
enforcing the rights created by the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments.
They include, in order of their passage: Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; Act
of May 21, 1866, ch. 86, 14 Stat. 50 (making kidnapping for purpose of enslavement
illegal); Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (prohibiting peonage); Civil Rights
Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (guaranteeing the right to vote and the right to full and
equal benefit of the laws); Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (regulating elections);
Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (providing for enforcement of fourteenth
amendment); Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (providing civil and criminal
penalties for discrimination in accommodations, transportation, public amusements, and
jury selection). The current versions of these Acts may be found in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-
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tory practices, the existence of an illicit motive was rarely disputed? In traditional racial discrimination cases today, however,
proof of discriminatory motivation is essential.

A. Proof of Discriminatory Purpose in the
Traditional Racial Discrimination Case
The traditional racial discrimination case involves the disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals.14The most
recent formulation of the discriminatory purpose theory in cases
involving disparate treatment appeared in McDonnell Douglas
1983, 1985-1992, 1994 (1976).
For a discussion of the early history of the Civil War amendments and the Enforcement Acts, see 6 C. FAIRMAN,
HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME
COURTOF THE UNITEDSTATES
89& T. LESKES,supra note 1, at 41-101.
133, 253-365, 1117-300 (1971); M. KONVITZ
23. The jury selection cases brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1875 involved the
deliberate exclusion by state officials of blacks from jury service. See, e.g., Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), had to do with
the denial of admission of blacks to an inn, a theater, and a railroad. And Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), involved the forcible ejection of a man from a coach
reserved for whites because he was one-eighth Negro.
Other early cases involving similar instances of overt discrimination arose in the fields
of public education, see, e.g., Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (Chinese girl living
in Mississippi prohibited from attending the only high school in the county because of her
race); Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (county board of
education in Georgia closed black high school, and parents of black students sought an
order requiring the board to reduce expenditures for corresponding white high school),
voting rights, see, e.g., Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (statute authorizing Democratic Party executive committee to determine party membership invalidated where the
committee barred blacks from party membership); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927)
(Texas statute prohibiting Negros from participating in Democratic Party primary elections invalidated), housing, see, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (discriminatory covenant); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (discriminatory city zoning ordinance), travel, see, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (black passenger
on the Southern Railway denied food service because of race); Morgan v. Virginia, 328
U.S. 373 (1946) (black woman asked to move to back of bus under Virginia segregation
law); Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941) (black Congressman denied first-class
seat on train pursuant to Arkansas law), and graduate school cases, see, e.g., McLaurin
v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (black graduate student required to sit
in designated areas of classrooms); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)
(black denied admission to University of Missouri Law School because of race).
24. B. SCHLEI
& P. GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
LAW15 (1976). In the
employment field, for example, traditional discrimination cases generally deal with practices involving discharge, discipline, promotion, transfer, lay off, failure to train, or retaliation. Such cases, regardless of the jurisdictional basis of the cause of action, have
generally required proof of discriminatory intent. Id. a t 1153-54 & nn.5-11. See generally
id. a t 15-17, 23-25. While traditional discriminatory purpose (disparate treatment) cases
usually involve single plaintiffs, they may be brought as class actions. Id. a t 1157-58.
The disparate treatment theory has also been applied in title VII cases, see McDonnell Douglas Corp, v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and in actions brought under Q 1981,
see, e.g., Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 505 n.11 (6th Cir. 1974); Milton v. Bell
Laboratories, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 502 (D.N.J. 1977).
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Corp. v. Green,25an action brought under title VII by a black
mechanic and laboratory technician who charged that his dismissal was racially motivated." The McDonnell Court held that
a plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination by proving four facts:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualification^.^

Although the Court noted that this test "is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situation^,"^^ the essential inquiry in disparate treatment cases like McDonnell is always
the same-whether the conduct of the defendant was "racially
premised? The plaintiff must "demonstrate by competent evidence that the [stated] reasons for his rejection were in fact a
coverup for a racially discriminatory decision.
The plaintiff need not provide direct proof of intent, however.31Circumstantial evidence will suffice. For example, statistics may provide some evidence of intent (or lack of intent) to
discriminate." In fact, noted authorities on employment discrimination law have asserted that plaintiffs may find the "burden of
establishing a prima facie case" under this theory "relatively
easy."" Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the [plaintiffs] rejection. "34
25. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
26. Id. at 794.
27. Id. at 802 (footnote omitted).
28. Id. at 802 n.13.
29. Id. at 805 n.18.
30. Id. at 805.
31. See Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169, 175-77
(1st Cir.), vacated on othergrounds and remanded per curium, 99 S. Ct. 295 (1978); Peters
v. Jefferson Chem. Co., 516 F.2d 447,449 (5th Cir. 1975);B. SCHLEI& P. GROSSMAN,
supra
note 24, at 16.
& P.GROSSMAN,
supra note 24, at 1154-56.
32. B. S c ~ m
33. Id. a t 1155. The critical issue is whether the defendant's allegedly valid reason
for his conduct was a "pretext." Id. a t 1156 & n.31. See Proof of Purpose, supra note 2, at
740-42; notes 54-57 and accompanying text infra.
34. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802. The Supreme Court has
recently reaffirmed McDonnell's definition of the defendant's burden of production. See
Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 99 S. Ct. 295 (1978);Furnco Constr.
EMPLOYMENT
Corp. v. Waters, 98 S. Ct. 2943, 2948-51 (1978). See generally 2 A. LARSON,
DISCRIMENATION
§§ 50.00-.40 (1975 & Supp. 1978).
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B. Disproportionate Impact: Neutral Factors and
the Present Effects of Past Discrimination
The courts have created an exception to the traditional discriminatory purpose rule in "neutral factor" cases. Neutral factors include objective selection criteria such as standardized
tests, credit ratings, work histories, academic and professional
records, and minimum height and weight req~irements,~"hich
are presumably employed without intent to discriminate on the
basis of race. Such factors often disqualify minorities at higher
rates than groups that have not been historically disadvantaged
and as a result tend to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. Because the discriminatory purpose theory focuses on illicit
motive, it fails to compensate for inequalities created by the use
of such race-neutral factors. The attention of the courts in neutral
factor cases therefore has shifted from discriminatory motivation
to discriminatory consequence^.^^
1. Genesis of the disproportionate impact theory

By applying the statistical techniques used in early jury service cases,37and by utilizing the concept of the prima facie case,"
the courts formulated a new evidentiary theory for neutral factor
cases: disproportionate impact.3gThe theory developed initially
in equal protection race discrimination cases, then in title VlI
35. Professor Larson defines neutral factors as "those containing no specific reference
to race." Additional examples from the employment field include aptitude tests, education requirements, professional and academic employment tests, arrest and conviction
records, garnishment and bankruptcy records, drug history, and length of experience
EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
§ 73.00 (1977). Facially neutral
requirements. 3 A. LAR~ON
selection practices have also been challenged in housing cases, see, e.g., Boyd v. LeFrak
Organization, 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975), and jury service
cases, see, e.g., Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
36. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of
Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH.L. REV. 59, 62 (1972).
For a comparison of the disproportionate impact and discriminatory purpose theories,
see Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169, 174 & n.8, 175
(1st Cir.), vacated and remanded per curium, 99 S. Ct. 295 (1978). See also Disproportionate Impact, supra note 8, at 1268 n.4.
37. See, e.g., Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1947); Hill v. Texas, 316
U.S. 400, 405-06 (1942); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 594-98 (1935).
38. See Fessler & Haar, Beyond the Wrong Side of the Tracks: Municipal Services
in the Interstices of Procedure, 6 HARV.C.R.X.L.L. REV. 441, 447 & nn.22-23 (1971);
Larson, supra note 8, a t 91-93; Comment, Employment Discrimination-Washington v.
Davis: Splitting the Causes of Action Against Racial Discrimination in Employment, 8
LOY.CHI. L.J. 225, 235 & n.50 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Splitting].
39. See generally 3 A. LARSON,
supra note 35, $6 74.00-.64; Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV.540, 553-62 (1977).
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employment discrimination cases.40In 1971, the Supreme Court
legitimized the use of the disproportionate impact theory in title
~ ~ in that case chalVII cases in Griggs v. Duke Power C O .Blacks
lenged the power company's policy requiring that applicants have
a high school diploma or pass an intelligence test in order to be
considered for employment or transfer to higher paying jobs.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger emphasized
Congress' intention, expressed in the language of title VII, to
"remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employee^."^^
In many cases, the Griggs disproportionate impact standard
significantly reduces the plaintiff's initial burden of production.
Rather than inquire into the defendant's motives, the plaintiff
need only show that the challenged practice has a racially disproportionate impact. In the employment-testing field, the theory
serves to implement Congress' policy of assisting historically disadvantaged groups 6y outlawing selection criteria that disfavor
minorities unless they are shown to be essential to the operation
of the business.43
2.

Limiting the scope of the impact theory

The Griggs ruling prompted a wide application of the new
evidentiary theory in neutral factor race discrimination cases
brought under a variety of constitutional and statutory provisions." In June of 1976, this trend was dramatically interrupted?
40. Splitting, supra note 38, a t 236. For a comprehensive overview of the effect of
disproportionate impact analysis on title VII law, see Seelman, Employment Testing 1,aw:
The Federal Agencies Go Public with the Problems, 10 URB.LAW.1 (1978).
41. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See Blumrosen, supra note 36, a t 62 (Griggs' redefinition of
discrimination in terms of consequences termed new development in employment discrimination law). But cf. 3 A. LARSON,supra note 35, $ 75.31 (facially neutral tests were
supra note 24, a t 5 & n.9 (generally
invalidated before Griggs);B. SCHLEI& P. GROSSMAN,
tracing disproportionate impact theory to Griggs, but noting that standards similar to
those articulated in Griggs were applied in Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401
(C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd as modified, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972)).
42. 401 U.S. a t 429-30. The Court repeatedly emphasized that title VII's disproportionate impact standard originated in the language and purpose of the statute. Id. a t 42931.
43. Id. a t 430-31. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975).
For a general discussion of test validation and the "business necessity" requirement,
supra note 35, $4 77.00-.50, 78.00-.52; B. SCHLEI& P. GROSSMAN,
supra
see 3 A. LARSON,
note 24, a t 65-75. See also Lerner, Washington v. Davis: Quantity, Quality and Equality
in Employment Testing, 1976 SUP.CT. REV.263 (1976); SHOBEN,
Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employer Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under
Title VII, 56 TEX.L. REV.1 (1977); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment
Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV.L. REV.387 (1975).
44. See Schwemm, supra note 15, a t 987-1000; Note, Burden of Proof in Eyual Protection Discriminatory Impact Cases: An Emerging Standard, 26 CATH.U.L. REV.815, 817-
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Washington v. Davis is the first of a line of cases in which
the Court has attempted to reinforce the primacy of discriminatory intent in race discrimination law without saddling the plaintiff with an unreasonable burden of proof in neutral factor cases.
Davis involved a written personnel test administered by the District of Columbia police department to prospective recruits in
order to determine whether the applicants had acquired a certain level of verbal skill. Although the district court found that a
higher percentage of blacks failed the test than whites, it nevertheless granted summary judgment for the defendants based on
a finding that the percentage of black police recruits closely approximated the population ratio of eligible blacks in the recruiting area." The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed. Applying the Griggs rule, it noted that four
times as many blacks as whites failed the test." The Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals and upheld the written test,
declaring that "the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.""
Justice White examined initially the central purpose of the
equal protection claused9and the prior Court cases construing the
fourteenth amendment.50"[at is untenable," he reasoned, "that
21 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Burden of Proofl; Note, Discriminatory Purpose: What It
Means CJnder the Equal Protection Clause-Washington v. Davis, 26 DE PAUL
L. REV. 650,
653-57 (1977); Splitting, supra note 38, a t 237-40. See also Wilson, A Second I'ook at
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of
the Federal Courts, 58 VA.L. REV.844, 847-51 (1972).
Commenting on the broad application the lower courts had given to Griggs, Judge
Lambros observed in Arnold v. Ballard, 448 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (N.D. Ohio 1978):
In retrospect and in light of Washington v. Davis . . . it is now apparent
that the Federal courts, in their eagerness to redress some of the effects of a long
history of racial discrimination in this country, had not made the necessary fine
distinctions among claims brought under Title VII, under 42 U.S.C. 99 19811985, and/or under the equal protection clause.
45. Washington o. Davis was decided on June 7, 1976. In footnote 12 of that opinion,
Justice White noted the Court's disagreement with some 18 cases dealing with employment discrimination, urban renewal, zoning, public housing, and municipal services that
had improperly applied the disproportionate impact standard. 426 U.S. a t 244 n.12. Several of these cases were brought under 19th-century civil rights statutes. E.g., Bridgeport
Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n., 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.
1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458
F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
46. Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15,16 (D.D.C. 1972),rev'd, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), reu'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
47. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958-59 (D.C. Cir. 1975), reo'd, 426 U.S.229
( 1976).
48. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
49. Id. a t 239.
50. Id. at 239-45.
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the Constitution prevents the Government from seeking modestly
to upgrade the communicative abilities of its employees . . . ."51
Justice White also examined the scope of the fourteenth amendment and the "consequences [that] would perhaps be likely to
follow" if a disproportionate impact theory were to be applied.52
He observed that title VII analysis "involves a more probing judicial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts
of administrators and executives than is appropriate under the
Constitution where special racial impact, without discriminatory
purpose, is claimed."53
The practical effect of the Supreme Court decisions following
Davis has been to narrow the gap between the discriminatory
intent and disproportionate impact theories by liberalizing the
probative value of various kinds of circumstantial evidence relevant in an inquiry into motive." Nevertheless, there remains a
crucial distinction between the impact and purpose theories in
neutral factor cases: under the first a plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case by simply showing a racially disproportionate impact;
under the second the plaintiff must show something more than
mere statistical disparity. The added burden under the purpose
theory will vary according to the facts of the case. If the plaintiff
establishes extreme disproportionate impact, additional evidence
of discrimination may be unne~essary.~"n other cases, however,
the plaintiff may be required to produce evidence relating to the
circumstances of the decision, the statements or conduct of the
decisi~nmaker,~~
or the relative weight given various factors in
making the decision in order to establish a prima facie caseaS7
Id. at 245-46.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 247.
See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Arlington Heights outlines
the kinds of evidence that can be used to establish discriminatory purpose. 429 U.S. a t
265-68. See also Burden of Proof, supra note 44, a t 823-24 & n.50 (proof of intent does not
pose an impossible obstacle).
55. Justice White was careful not to exclude the possibility of using evidence of
disproportionate impact to show discriminatory purpose. "Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including
the fact . . . that the law bears more heavily on one race than another. It is also not
infrequently true that the discriminatory impact . . . may for all practical purposes
demonstrate unconstitutionality . . . Washington v. Davis, 426 U S . at 242. See also
id. a t 253-54 (Stevens, J., concurring).
56. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
51.
52.
53.
54.

."

265-68 (1977).
57. Id. at 270. See Mt. Healthy City School Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977). See generally Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of
('onstitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U.L.REV.36, 105-14 (1977); Schwemm, supra note
15. a t 1000-48.
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Washington v. Davis' decisive limitation on the scope of the
impact theory in constitutional cases has generated considerable
confusion as to the standards that should be applied in section
1981 and 1982 causes of action. Some courts have adopted the
Davis standard without discussing any of the underlying issues?
Other courts have analyzed the statute in light of Davis and
concluded that section 1981 causes of action require proof of discriminatory intent, noting the linguistic and historical similarities between the Reconstruction statute and the fourteenth
amendment on the one hand and the dissimilarities between section 1981 and title VII on the other? Still other courts have
concluded, however, that "the burden of proving intentional or
purposeful discrimination required under a constitutional claim
is not required" under section 1981, a "statutory claim."" Certain
commentators point to dicta in Davis that would appear to support this po~ition.~'
The most sensible view, in light of all of the
58. E.g., Chance v. Board of Examiners, 79 F.R.D. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (relief denied
because no proof of intent as required by Davis and Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)); Bacica v. Board of Educ., 451 F.
Supp. 882 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (termination of seniority status purposeful, therefore plaintiffs
entitled to recover under $6 1981 and 1983; cited Davis); Williams v. Ryan, 78 F.R.D. 364,
367 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (Davis "held that in suits brought under the 'Reconstruction Era' civil
rights acts, 42 U.S.C. $6 1981 and 1983, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that a
challenged employment practice is the result of an intent to discriminate"); Manica v.
Chrysler Corp., 83 Lab. Cas. 17,861 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (in the wake of Davis, "the courts
have clearly held that a 6 1981 cause of action does not arise merely upon a showing of
disparate impact"); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 526, 534
(S.D.N.Y .), (since Davis requires intent, "[ilt follows that sections 1981 and 1983 require
the same showing") vacated and remanded, 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977); Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6878,6881 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (citing
Davis, (j 1981 claim dismissed for failure to allege discriminatory purpose). See also Pettit
v. Gingerich, 427 F. Supp. 282,284,291-94 (D. Md. 1977) (dismissing action brought under
$$ 1981 and 1983 because no intentional discrimination was found); Oritz v. Bach, 14 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1019 (D. Colo. 1977) (equating 6 1981 with constitutional cause of
action).
59. E.g., Arnold v. Ballard, 448 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Lewis v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949 (D. Md. 1977); Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138,
1181-82 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
60. Dawson v. Pastrick, 441 F. Supp. 133,140 (N.D. Ind. 1977) (indicating the Griggs'
standards are applicable to 6 1981). See also Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 4713, 4714-15 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (following Davis v. County of Los
Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978) (No. 77-1553));
Woods v. City of Saginaw, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5988, 5990 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (Davis
"refers only to constitutional claims").
61. Splitting, supra note 38, at 227, 231, 242 n.92, 247-49; 11RICH.
L.REV. 209, 218
& n.60 (1976). These commentators argue that Davis indicates title VII standards are
applicable in (j 1981 causes of action. But see Arnold v. Ballard, 448 F. Supp. 1025, 102728 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949,963 n.11 (D. Md.
1977).
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confusion, is that Davis did not unambiguously resolve the
issue.62
One of the most recent discussions of the intent issue occurs
in Davis u. County of Los A n g e l e ~The
. ~ ~ dispute in that case
involved two written examinations administered in August 1969
and January 1972 by the Los Angeles County Fire Department
pursuant to its procedures for screening applicants for entry-level
fireman positions.64Plaintiffs, on behalf of all present and future
black and Mexican-American applicants, challenged the tests
and the department's five-foot seven-inch height requirement.
The United States district court upheld the minimum height
standard but found that both qualification tests had a discriminatory impact on minority applicants? Because the court found
Justice Stevens noted the difficulty of applying title VII standards to other statutory
schemes:
In a general way [title W]standards shed light on the issues, but there is
sufficient individuality and complexity to that statute, and to the regulations
promulgated under it, to make it inappropriate simply to transplant those standards in their entirety into a different statutory scheme having a different history.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U S . a t 255 (Stevens, J., concurring).
62. Some lower courts and commentators have taken this view. See, e.g., Davis v.
County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1339-40, 1347 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S.
Ct. 3087 (1978) (No. 77-1553); Comment, Washington v. Davis: Reassessing the Bars to
L. REV.747, 748 n.15 (1977).
Employment Discrimination, 43 BROOKLYN
63. 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978) (No. 77-1553).
64. Judge Wallace explained the pre-1971 hiring procedure as follows:
The process began with the written test and a physical agility test and the top
scorers were then selected for oral interviews. A total score was given each
applicant, with the discriminatory written test having a 35 percent weighted
value. The highest ranking candidates were certified for placement on the eligibility list from which vacancies were filled. When the list was exhausted, which
usually happened in about two years, a new examination process would begin
in order to produce a new eligibility list.
Id. a t 1345 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
The procedure was changed in 1971. A new written test was developed in an attempt
to eliminate cultural bias, and the examination was not used as a ranking device but was
graded on a pass-fail basis. Ninety-seven percent of the applicants passed the written
exam. The department proposed that 500 of the passing applicants be selected a t random
for interviews (giving every applicant who passed the exam an equal chance to be chosen
for an oral interview), but was enjoined from so doing because of county and civil service
regulations requiring that selections be made on merit. In response to this ruling, an
abortive attempt was made to utilize an interview list consisting of the top 544 scorers on
the written exam, of which 492 were white (representing 25.8% of the white applicants),
10 black (representing 5.1% of the black applicants), and 33 Mexican-American. Finally,
one year after taking the examination and 18 months after applying, all passing applicants
were interviewed and an eligibility list was certified. Id. a t 1337 (majority opinion); id. a t
1345-46 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
65. Id. a t 1337 (majority opinion). For a summary of the relevant statistics, see id. ;
id. a t 1346 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
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that use of the two tests violated both section 1981 and title VII
and because of the department's "bad reputation as an employer
in the minority c ~ m m u n i t y , "the
~ ~court ordered accelerated hiring in the ratio of one black and one Mexican-American for every
three whites hired until the effects of past discrimination had
been eliminated.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
after granting a rehearing67to consider the impact of Washington
u. Davis, upheld the district court's determination that the 1972
written examination violated section 1981 because of its disproportionate effect upon minority applicants and reversed the judgment approving the five-foot seven-inch limitation. However, the
circuit court held that the plaintiffs had no standing to challenge
the 1969 examination. The majority expressed reluctance to
apply the discriminatory purpose standard because of its belief
that further limitations on the impact rule would "produce undesirable substantive law conflicts" and "would dilute what has
been a potent remedy for the ills of countless minority employees."W
Judge Wallace dissented. After an extensive analysis of the
legal issues, he concluded that "the legislative history of section
1982 indicates that it should track the Fourteenth Amendment's
standards of proof."" In Judge Wallace's view, practical reasons
necessitate a stricter standard in section 1981 cases. A requirement of discriminatory intent, like the administrative prerequisites under title VII, serves to screen out frivolous claims. Furthermore, divorcing section 1981from the stricter constitutional standard motivates plaintiffs to proceed under the statute, thus undermining the efficacy of the fourteenth amendment. Finally,
because of the broad scope of section 1981, any decrease in the
burden of proof necessary to make the out a racial discrimination
claim " 'should await legislative prescription.' "70
66. Id. a t 1336 (majority opinion). Of the department's 1,762 firemen, about 53 (3%)
were Mexican-American and 9 (0.5%) were black a t the time of the district court judgment. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari a t 6 n.1, County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 98 S.
Ct. 3087 (1978) (No. 77-1553). The trial court found that 10.8% of the population of Los
Angeles County was black and 18.3% was Mexican-American. 566 F.2d a t 1345 & n.1
(Wallace, J., dissenting).
67. The Ninth Circuit entered its original opinion in the case on Oct. 20, 1976. Davis
v . County of Los Angeles, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, 1217 (9th Cir. 1976), withdrawn and
new opinion announced, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S . Ct. 3087 (1978)
(No. 77-1553).
68. 566 F.2d a t 1340.
69. Id. a t 1348 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
70. Id. a t 1350-51 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. a t 248).
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Although none have done so as exhaustively as the Ninth
Circuit, most of the other circuits have addressed the issue. Three
circuits seem to agree that proof of discriminatory purpose is not
necessary in actions brought under section 1981,71while five circuits have indicated that the burden of proof in section 1981
causes of action is equivalent to the burden in constitutional

IV. THECIVILRIGHTS
ACTSOF 1866
AND 1870-IMPACT OR PURPOSE?
Discussion of the evidentiary standard applicable to sections
1981 and 1982 can be divided into five areas: the implications of
prior Supreme Court decisions, the in pari materia rule, legislative intent, the relevance of the broad scope of the Reconstruction
Acts, and the impact the choice of standards will have on the role
of the judiciary.
A. The Supreme Court Precedents
In a line of cases that has engendered considerable discus- -

-

-

- -

-

- - -

-

71. See Davis v. county
Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), eert. granted.
98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978) (No. 77-1553); Kinsey v. First Regional Secs., 557 F.2d 830, 838 n.22
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (dicta in footnote indicating that title VII and 6 1981 do not impose the
same burden of proof as the Constitution).
The Fourth Circuit has read title Vn standards dealing with seniority systems into
4 1981. Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 575 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), petition for eert.
filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3153 (U.S. July 31, 1978) (No. 78-179). Arguably, the reasoning of the
court could be extended to justify the adoption of title VII evidentiary standards in
4 1981 causes of action.
72. See Williams v. DeKalb County, 582 F.2d 2 (5th Cir. 1978) (adopting constitutional evidentiary standards for 6 1981causes of action); Donne11 v. General Motors Corp.,
576 F.2d 1292, 1300 (8th Cir. 1978) (6 1981 involves different standards of proof than title
VII); Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1978) (6 1981 claims follow constitutional rather than title VII evidentiary standards); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564
F.2d 126, 140 (3d Cir. 1977) (implying that burdens of proof under 6 1981 are the same as
under the Constitution), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1457 (1978); Chicano Police Officers Ass'n
v. Stover, 552 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1977) (prior holding that the measure of a claim under
Ei 1981 is essentially the same as that applied under title VII acknowledged as contrary to
Washington u. Davis); Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1976) (because no
constitutional claim was established, no 4 1981 claim could be made out; constitutional
claim was dismissed because plaintiff failed to allege intentional discrimination). Cf.
Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 921, 912 (3d Cir. 1978) (in enacting title
VII, the 88th Congress did not intend "to circumscribe the remedial powers of the federal
courts under 64 1981, 1983,1985, and 1988"). Rut cf. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1191 n.37 (5th Cir. 1978) (title VII protection of bona fide seniority
system should apply in cases brought under 6 1981; court agrees with Johnson v. Ryder
Truck Lines, Inc., 575 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3153 ( U S .
July 31, 1978) (No. 78-179); interestingly, Pettway was decided several months before
Williams u. DeKalb County).
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~ i o n ,the
? ~ Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that the Civil
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870 prohibit "racial discrimination in
the making and enforcement of private contract^."^^ In Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer CO.,'~the Court held that "5 1982 bars all racial
discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of
property."76 In addition, the Court stated, the 1866 Act "was
meant to prohibit all racially motivated deprivations of the rights
enumerated in the statute,"" implying that section 1982 does not
extend to nonracially motivated practices that nevertheless discriminate in fact. Language in other opinions also suggests that
section 1981 prohibits only racially motivated refusals to make
and enforce contract^.'^ These pronouncements must be regarded
as dicta, however, because in none of the cases was the question
of motivation at issue; all involved blatant discriminatory practices. While Washington v. Davis involved a facially neutral practice that operated discriminatorily, the case did not resolve the
intent issue under the Reconstruction statutes.7gThe Supreme
Court cases, then, do not explicitly decide the question of which
evidentiary standard is applicable to sections 1981 and 1982.
73. See note 8 supra. See also Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of
the Thirteenth Amendment (chs. I-VIII), 12 HOUS.L. REV. 1,331, 357, 593, 610,844,871,
1070 (1974-1975).
74. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 & n:S (1976).
75. 392 U S . 409 (1968).
76. Id. a t 413 (emphasis in original).
77. Id. a t 426 (emphasis added; emphasis on "all" deleted). See also id. a t 420 n.25
(issue in Jones involves "an actual refusal to sell to a Negro" (emphasis in original)); id.
a t 421-22 ((j 1982 "encompass[es] every racially motivated refusal to sell or rent"); id.
a t 449 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Court's holding that "respondents' racially motivated refusal to sell [petitioners] a house entitles them to judicial relief ').
78. In Runyon v. McCrary, the Court, while discussing the Act of 1866, stated:
Just as in Jones a Negro's 5 1 right to purchase property on equal terms with
whites was violated when a private person refused to sell to the prospective
purchaser solely because he was a Negro, so also a Negro's 8 1 right to "make
and enforce contracts" is violated if a private offeror refuses to extend to a
Negro, solely because he is a Negro, the same opportunity to enter into contracts
as he extends to white offerees.
427 U.S. 160, 170-71 (1976) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See also McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 US.273,288 (1976) 5 1981 prohibits racial discrimination
in the making and enforcement of contracts); Runyan v. McCrary, 427 U.S. a t 192 (White,
.J., dissenting) ("We are urged here to extend the meaning and reach of 42 U.S.C. Q 1981
so as to establish a general prohibition against a private individual's or institution's
refusing to enter into a contract with another person because of that person's race."); id.
a t 192 passim (White, J., dissenting) ($ 1981 does not prohibit private racially motivated
refusals to contract); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 235-37 (1969)
("[rlespondents' actions in refusing to approve the assignment of [Sullivan'sl membership share [because Freeman was black] was clearly an interference with Freeman's right
to 'lease"' under Q 1982).
79. See notes 58-62 and accompanying text supra.
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B. The In Pari Materia Rule
The argument has been made that since the Court has declared that title VII and section 1981 "embrace 'parallel or overlapping remedies against discrimination,' "no the two statutes are
in pari materia and should be construed togetherY According to
Sutherland, "[sltatutes are considered to be in pari materia-to
pertain to the same subject matter when they relate to the . . .
same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or
object."n2If two statutes are found to be in pari materia, the later
statute governs the construction of the earlier e n a ~ t m e n t . ~ "
Therefore, the argument goes, since the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits practices that result in disproportionate effect^,^' the
same standard should apply to the earlier Civil Rights Acts.
The in pari materia rule is not applicable in the case of the
Reconstruction statutes, however, because title VII and section 1981
do not relate to the "same class of persons or things," nor do they
have the "same purpose or object." Even were title VII to extend to
all employment relationships, which it does
it would not begin
to reach the conduct potentially within the scope of section 1981.
The Supreme Court in Johnson u. Railway Express AgencyuRtook
great pains to point out that there are significant substantive and
procedural differences between the two statutes;n7they provide
"separate, distinct, and independent" remedies.nnLikewise, the fact
that the two Acts generally seek to eliminate racial discrimination
does not imply that they have the same "purpose or object." As
- -

80. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d a t 1340 (footnote omitted) (quoting
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974)).
81. Disproportionate Impact, supra note 8, a t 1286-87 & n.116-17.
STATUTES
AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
4 51.03, a t 298 (4th
82. 2A J. SUTHERLAND,
ed. C. Sands ed. 1973) (footnote omitted). See also id. 4 49.11.
83. Id. 4 51.03, a t 300.
84. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
85. See note 9 supra.
86. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
87. Id. a t 457-61. Compare Brown, Handling a Case from Inception to Trial,in EQUAL
COMPLIANCE,^^^^, a t 105, 105-41 (title VII procedures) with 3
EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY
A. LARSON,
supra note 35, $8 90.00-.50 (4 1981 procedures).
88. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. a t 461. The Supreme Court has
similarly pointed to
the vast differences between, on the one hand, a general statute [section 19821
appliable only to racial discrimination in the rental and sale of property and
enforceable only by private acting on their own initiative, and, on the other
hand, a detailed housing law [title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 19681, applicable to a broad range of discriminatory practices and enforceable by a complete
arsenal of federal authority.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 417 (1968).
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Judge Wallace explained, "[tlhat both statutes can apply to the
same facts and that both may afford similar remedies is beside the
point. The same can be said of title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment, yet, after Washington v. Davis, their remains an essential
'operational distinction' between them. ""
Similarly, the fact t h a t employment discrimination cases
brought under title VII involves one evidentiaiy theory does not
necessitate the application of the same theory in employment cases
brought under section 1981. As Judge Wisdom observed in a similar
context, "[dlifferent treatment of similar legislative and constitutional provisions" has already become a reality in discrimination
law? Reliance on the in pari materia rule, therefore, does not resolve the question of the appropriate evidentiary standard for causes
of action under sections 1981 and 1982.

C. The Inquiry into Congressional Intent
It is well settled that the intent of the legislature is the primary test in statutory interpretation." According to Sutherland,
"The reason for this doubtless lies in an assumption that an obligation to construe statutes in such a way as to carry out the will
. . . of the lawmaking branch of the government is mandated by
principles of separation of powers."g2
89. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d a t 1348 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
90. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 237 n.8 (5th Cir.)(Wisdom, J., specially concurring), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3283 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1978) (No. 78-492). In the
same footnote, Judge Wisdom added:
While Washington v. Davis found that an intent test applied to an employment
discrimination claim brought under the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment, it specifically reaffirmed that such an intent was not necessary
under Title VII [citations omitted]. Similarly, although the Court struck down
the equal protection challenge to the zoning laws of Arlington Heights, it remanded the case for consideration of the statutory issues. On remand, the Court
of Appeals held that a violation of Title VIII could be made out without proof
of a discriminatory intent. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village
of Arlington Heights, 7 Cir. 1977, 558 F.2d 1283. Accord, United States v. City
of Black Jack, 8 Cir. 1974, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85.
Id.
supra note 82, Q 45.05, a t 15.
91. 2A J. SUTHERLAND,
92. Id. Chief Justice Burger has recently emphasized the primacy of congressional
intention in interpreting legislative policies:
Our system of government is, after all, a tripartite one, with each Branch having
certain defined functions delegated to it by the Constitution. While "[it! is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department t o say what the
law is," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 . . . (1803), it is equally-and
emphatically-the exclusive province of the Congress not only to formulate
legislative policies, mandate programs and projects, but also to establish their
relative priority for the Nation.
Tennessee Valley ~ ~ t v.hHill,
. 98 S. Ct. 2279, 2301 (1978).
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The original intention

Because of the controversy aroused by the extension of the
Reconstruction statutes to cover.private conduct, commentators
have examined extensively the legislative history of sections 1981
and 1982 in an attempt to discern the intention of the ThirtyNinth C o n g r e s ~ The
. ~ ~ Supreme Court concluded in Runyon v.
McCrary that section 1981 derives both from the thirteenth and
the fourteenth amendmenbg4Judge Wallace, dissenting in Davis
v. County of Los Angeles, indicated that because
section 1981 enjoys a unique historical and conceptual relationship to the Fourteenth Amendment which is not shared by Title
VII . . ., it is quite proper to assume . . . that the standards for
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under section
1981 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should be the same: there must be proof of discriminatory
intentsg5

A categorical denial by the Court of the historical relationship between section 1981 and fourteenth amendment would not
necessarily require a different result. The fact that the Thirty:
Ninth Congress intended the fourteenth amendment to proscribe
s
the thirteenth
only racially motivated c o n d u c t g ~ m p l i ethat
93. One of the most authoritative treatments of the history of the Civil Rights Acts
supra note 22, at 1163-206.See also J. TENBROEK,
of 1866 and 1870 is found in 6 C. FAIRMAN,
EQUAL
UNDERLAW174-97 (rev. ed. 1965); Greenfield & Kates, supra note 9, a t 662-64;
Gressman, The IJnhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH.L. REV.1323 (1952);
Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement
Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM.
L. REV.449, 466-91 (1974);
Disproportionate Impact, supra note 8, a t 1275-80;Private Discriminations, supra note 8,
at 617-21; Racial Discrimination in Employment, supra note 8, at 617-21.
94. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). The Court found Ei 1981 "to be drawn from both Ei 16 of the
1870 Act and Ji 1 of the 1866 Act." Id. a t 160, 168 n.8. The 1870 Act was a fourteenth
amendment statute, and the 1866 Act was a thirteenth amendment statute. Id. a t 205
(White, J., dissenting). For a thorough analysis of the relationship between the 1866 Civil
GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY
22Rights Act and the fourteenth amendment, see R. BERGER,
36, 38-40, 46, 48, 140-273 (1977). See generally Bickel, The Original IJnderstanding and
the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV.
L. REV.1 (1955).
According to Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), Ei 1982 was derived
from the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id. a t 422.
95. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d a t 1349 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
96. It has been suggested that the discriminatory purpose standard for constitutional
causes of action in Washington v. Davis was not required by the text of the fourteenth
amendment, "but was simply a matter of the court's discretion." Proof of Purpose, supra
note 2, a t 739 & n.73. "In [Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977)], on the other hand, the Court seemed concerned that the adoption
of a discriminatory effect standard would not show proper deference to the constitutional
functions of the legislature and the executive, by involving the courts in reviewing the
merits of political decisions." Id. a t 744.
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amendment carries a similar p r o s ~ r i p t i o n The
. ~ ~ historical context and the debates of the Thirty-Ninth Congress clearly indicate that the framers of the Reconstruction amendments and
Enforcement Acts, in the massive undertaking of granting the
newly emancipated blacks practical freedom, intended that the
guarantee of fundamental rights outlaw only illicitly motivated
forms of d i s c r i m i n a t i ~ n . ~ ~
2. Implied modification
A stronger argument for a legislatively mandated impact
standard could be made by showing that Congress modified the
traditional purpose standard when it passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act in 1972." With respect to the 1972 Act, the
Supreme Court commented in Runyon v. McCrary: "Congress
. . . specifically considered and rejected an amendment that
would have repealed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as interpreted
-

-

97. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d a t 1349 n.8 (Wallace, J., dissenting)
(Wallace believes t h a t "discriminatory intent is required in Thirteenth Amendment
cases").
98. Professor Beger notes:
While most men were united in a desire to protect the freedmen from outrage
and oppression in the South by prohibiting discrimination with respect to
"fundamental rights," without which freedom was illusory, to go beyond this
with a campaign for political and social equality was, as Senator James R.
Doolittle of Wisconsin confessed, "frightening" to the Republicans who
"represented States containing the despised and feared free negroes."
R. BERGER,
supra note 94, a t 15 (footnote omitted) (quoting D. DONALD,
CHARLES
SUMNER
AND THE RIGHTSOF MAN158 (1970)).
In an extensive analysis of the Q$ 1981 and 1982 intent issue, one commentator
concludes:
Even if it is accepted that the legislative history of the two Acts supports the
Supreme Court's view that these laws were intended to regulate private behavior, it cannot seriously be argued that that legislative history also supports the
contention that Congress meant these laws to outlaw any conduct with unintended racially disproportionate effects upon contracts. A reading of the relevant congressional debates reveals absolutely nothing that would lend credence
to such a notion. On the contrary, these sources give every indication that these
laws were intended only to outlaw those actions undertaken with invidious,
discriminatory motivation.
I)isproportionate Impact, supra note 8, a t 1280 (footnotes omitted).
The courts have held that certain other Reconstruction civil rights statutes require
proof of discriminatory intent. Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 (1976), for example, require proof of discriminatory intent. E-g., Williams v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 1081,
1086-87 (8th Cir. 1977); Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949,963-65 (D.Md.
1977). 42 U.S.C. 8 1985(3) (1976) also requires proof of discriminatory intent. Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 96-102 (1971). Both $ 1983 and 8 1985(3) were enacted as part
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, $4 1-2, 17 Stat. 13.
99. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 111 (1972) (codified a t 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16 to -17
(1976)).
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by this Court in Jones . . . . There could hardly be a clearer
indication of congressional agreement with the view that # 1981
does reach private acts of racial d i s c r i m i n a t i ~ n . "Congressional
~~~
endorsement of the view that sections 1981 and 1982 reach private
acts of discrimination, however, does not necessarily imply that
Congress also assented to the application of a disproportionate
impact standard in cases brought under the early statutes. The
history of the proposed 1972 amendment does not indicate that
Congress intentionally or tacitly acquiesced to a modification of
the traditional burden of proof in actions brought under the Reconstruction Acts.'"' Since it seems doubtful that Congress intended to modify the evidentiary principles historically appicable
to the nineteenth-century Civil Rights Acts, the original intention
should govern. Io2
100. 427 U.S. a t 174-75 (emphasis in original). See also id. a t 174 n.11.
101. Congressional debate on the Equal Opportunity Act came a t a time when the
courts were expanding application of the Griggs rule to § 1981 employment cases. See,
e . g , Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 325-26 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U S . 950
(1972). Congress recognized the potential impact of the Griggs standard on civil rights law.
See, e . g , 118 CONG.REC.3371 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. a t 4925-26 (remarks
of Sen. Allen); 117 CONG.REC. 31961 (1971) (bill introduced that would have altered
language of title VII to reflect Griggs rule) (remarks of Rep. Perkins); H.R. REP.NO. 238,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 20-22 (1971); S. REP. NO. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1971).
In debating legislation that would have made title VII the exclusive employment
discrimination remedy, Senators pointed to the differences between the 1866 and 1871
statutes and title VII. See, e.g., 118 CONG.REC.3370 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (statute of
limitations for 19th-century statutes differs from limitation period under 1964 Act); id.
a t 3960 (remarks of Sen. Hruska); i d . a t 3961-62 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (1866 statute,
unlike title VII, reaches third parties guilty of discrimination).
In his final argument against making title VII the exclusive employment discrimination remedy, Senator Williams described the distinctive nature of 19th-century civil rights
law:
Two of the basic statutes that have guided this country for a century would
be wiped out, in substantial part, by this amendment. . . . [citing Q 19811
For 100 years, there has been built a body of law dealing with the rights of
individuals . . . .
The statute I have quoted was followed up, in 1871, by another provision.
These are basic laws from which . . . developed a body of law that should be
preserved and not wiped out.
Id. a t 3963-64. The "body of law" referred to by Senator Williams consisted of the court
opinions construing the Reconstruction civil rights legislation. These cases had almost
exclusively applied a discriminatory intent standard. I t seems clear, then, that although
Congressmen and Senators were conscious of the Griggs standard, they did not intend to
disturb the court precedents dealing with § § 1981 and 1982.
102. It might also be argued that Congress impliedly repealed 4 1981's traditional
purpose requirement when it enacted title VII in 1964. This argument is unpersuasive.
Several commentators have expressed the view that title VII, as originally envisioned, was
intended to proscribe only illicitly motivated conduct. B. SCHLEI& P. GROSSMAN,
supra
note 24, a t 1, 15, Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of I S # , 84 HARV.L. REV.1109, 1113-18 (1971). The issue was not
definitively settled until Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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3. Purpose of the ninteenth-century Civil Rights Acts: Equal
treatment or equal status?

For many, the fact that the framers of the Reconstruction
legislation intended to prohibit only conduct that can be shown
to be illicitly motivated would not be determinative of the burden
of proof issue.IoBThe view that present-day policy should control
questions of constitutional or statutory construction is widely
held.lo4Unless the courts intend to completely abrogate the. principle of separation of powers, however,I0"hey must defer to indiThe Supreme Court has on several occasions emphasized that title VII and 8 1981
are independent. For example, in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454
(1975), the Court noted the congressional finding "'that the two procedures augment each
other and are not mutually exclusive.' H.R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 19 (1971). See also S. Rep.
No. 92-415, p. 24 (1971)." Id. at 459. The Court noted "the independence of the avenues
of relief respectively available under Title VII and the older 9 1981," id. a t 460, concluding
"that the remedies available under Title VII and under Q 1981, although related, and
although directed to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent." Id.
a t 461. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974),the Court stated that "the
legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to
pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and
federal statutes." Id. a t 48 (footnote omitted). See generally id. a t 47, 48 n.9, 49-54.
Similarly, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Court identified
the significant differences between title VIII and 4 1982, endorsing the view expressed by
Representative Kelly of New York "'that the scope [of 4 19821 was somewhat different
[than title VIII], the remedies and procedures were different, and still the new law was
. . . quite necessary."' Id. a t 416 (quoting 114 CONG.REC.2807 (1968)) (footnote omitted).
"The Civil Rights Act of 1968 does not mention 42 U.S.C. Q 1982, and we cannot assume
that Congress intended to effect any change, either substantive or procedural, in the prior
statute." Id. at 416 n.20 (emphasis added).
103. One commentator has argued that "[tlhe Supreme Court's deemphasis of legislative history as a guide to specific contemporary applications of Reconstruction era civil
rights legislation is not without precedent." Expanding Scope, supra note 8, a t 420.
Construing Q 1981 "in accordance with contemporary mores seems necessary if the law is
to remain responsive to evolving social values." Id. See, e.g., Promise of Equality, supra
note 13, a t 324 ("the language of the impassioned Reconstruction Era congressional debates is of limited value today" (footnote omitted)).
FACESOF POWER(1967); C. BLACK,THE
104. See generally, A. BERLE,THE THREE
PEOPLE
AND THE COURT
(1960); Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court:
Some Interventions Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN.L. REV.169 (1968).
Professor Blumrosen, commenting on the Supreme Court's "sensitive, liberal interpretation of Title VII" in Griggs, observed that "[a] judge may feel more comfortable in
rendering a liberal interpretation of a statute than in interpreting the Constitution since
a decision based on the Constitution is less easily revised." Blumrosen, supra note 36, a t
63.
105. Professor Berger contends that when Chief Justice Warren declared that "'we
cannot turn back the clock to 1868,' he in fact rejected the framers' intention as irrelevant." According to Berger, "[sluch conduct impels one to conclude that the Justices
are become a law unto themselves." R. BERCER,supra note 94, a t 408 & n.5 (footnote
omitted) (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954)). See generally D.
Ho~owrrz,THECOURTS
AND SOCIAL
POLICY12-21 (1977); Speech by Philip B. Kurland,
Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference (April 26, 1978).
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cations of legislative purpose-if not expressly stated, then implicitly derived from the principles or policies embodied in legislative ena~trnents.'~~
Commentators have identified two basic values that undergird all civil rights legislation: equal treatment and equal status.Io7Equal treatment, in its most restrictive form, "would prohibit race-conscious decisionmaking in all circumstances," or,
liberally defined, "would permit and in some circumstances require race-conscious decisionmaking as a remedy for the effects
of past de jure discrimination by the same decisionmaker, but
would prohibit it in all other situation^."^^^ Equal status, on the
other hand, "is concerned with remedying inequalities of political, social, and economic status. This approach would require
. . . decisionmakers always to consider race . . . .w 109
Each principal evidentiary theory embodies one of these values. The discriminatory purpose theory promotes the value of
equal treatment by conditioning the plaintiff's right to prevail on
proof that the defendant's act was prompted by an improper
motive. The plaintiff is not favored by a presumption of a generalized injury originating at some distant place and time. The disproportionate impact theory, on the other hand, compensates
victims of past societal discrimination by easing the burden of
proof. It promotes the value of equal status by allowing the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination without reference to the defendant's good or bad intentions.""
Which value did the Thirty-Ninth Congress intend to implement under the Acts of 1866 and 1870? Section 1of the Act of 1866
(from which both sections 1981 and 1982 were derived)"' provided
[tlhat all persons [considered citizens of the United States]
of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition
of slavery or involuntary servitude . . . shall have the same
106. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND,
supra note 82, # 45.09, a t 30.
107. This Comment uses "equal treatment" and "equal status" consistently with the
discussion of Professor Fiss in Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOSOPHY
& PUB.APP. 107 (1976). See also Proof of Purpose, supra note 2, a t 727-28 & n.21. Commentators have relied on the text and history of the Constitution and the Civil Rights Acts
both to support and refute arguments for the adoption of one or the other principle as the
dominant equal protection value. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 1, a t 1, 5; Fiss, supra at
118-19 & n.16, 147 & n.63. See generally Tussman & tenBmek, The Equal Protection of
the I,aws, 37 CALIF.L. REV.341 (1949).
108. Proof of Purpose, supra note 2, at 728 (footnotes omitted).
109. Id. a t 728.
110. Proof of Purpose, supra note 2, a t 728-29 & n.24. ("the Court has responded t o
the problem of equal status by using evidentiary presumptions to aid a plaintiff in his
proof of racial discrimination").
111. See note 94 supra.
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right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens . . . .112

The Supreme Court has made it clear that the Thirty-Ninth Congress intended that the 1866 Act apply equally to whites as well
as nonwhites. In McDonald u. Santa Fe Trail Transportation
Co., 11:' Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, began his analysis of section 1981 by examining the language quoted above, noting that it "explicitly applies to 'all persons' . . . including white
persons."114Turning to the legislative history, Justice Marshall
relied on comments made during the Senate debates such as the
following: " '[The bill] simply gives to persons who are of different races or colors the same civil rights' . . . '[Tlhe white as well
as the black is included in this first section' . . . '[The bill]
provides, in the first place, that the civil rights of all men, without
regard to color, shall be equal . . . .' "115
In response to Senator Davis' objection that section 2 of the
Act extended to blacks a protection never given to whites, Senator Trumball, one of the bill's sponsors, stated:
"Sir, this bill applies to white m e n as well as black men. It
declares that all persons in the United States shall be entitled
to the same civil rights, the right to the fruit of their own
labor. . . . [Tlhe only object of [the bill] is to secure equal
rights to all the citizens of the country, [it is] a bill that protects a white m a n just as m u c h as a black rnan."l1"

Senator Trumball expressly disavowed the idea that the bill
'discriminates in favor of colored persons.' "I1' The Senators
repeatedly affirmed that the races were to be treated equally;
their rights before the law were to be the same.11x
The House debates also clearly indicate that the value espoused by the proponents of the bill was equal treatment and not

"

112. Civil Rights Act of 1866,.ch. 31, Ej 1, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at U.S.C. $ 5
1981-1982 (1970)).
113. 427 US. 273 (1976).
114. Id. at 287 (emphasis in original).
115. Id. at 289 n.20 (citations omitted) (brackets in original) (quoting CONG.GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 504-05, 601 (1866) (remarks of Senators Howard, Johnson, and
Henrick)).
116. Id. at 290 (emphasis in original) (quoting CONG.GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599
(1866)).
117. Id. at 295 (quoting CONG.GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1758 (1866)).
118. Id. at 288;289 n.20.
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equal status. Referring to the bill, Representative Shallabarger
declared:
"Its whole effect is to require that whatever rights as to each of
those enumerated civil . . . matters the states may confer upon
one race or color of the citizens shall be held by all races in
equality. Your State may deprive women of the right to sue or
contract or testify, and children from doing the same. But if you
do so, or do not so as to one race, you shall treat the other
likewi~e."I~~

The values expressed in the legislative history of title VII as
interpreted by GriggsImcontrast markedly with the expressed intentions of the nineteenth-century legislators. Fully aware of the
disparate impact resulting from standardized tests, the EightyEighth Congress intended to include within the scope of title VII
the consequences as well as the motivations of employment practices.I2' While the Reconstruction Acts and the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 were all broadly aimed a t eradicating discrimination, they
focused on different notions of equality. The historical origins of
the 1866 and 1870 Acts indicate that sections 1981 and 1982, like
the Constitution, are more circumscribed in their treatment of
equality than title VII.

D. Scope of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts
The broad coverage of the fourteenth amendment figured
prominently in the Supreme Court's decision to require the application of the discriminatory purpose theory in constitutional
causes of action. The Court noted that application of a disproportionate impact theory to the equal protection clause "'would render suspect each difference in treatment among the grant classes,
however lacking the racial motivation and however otherwise rational the treatment might be."qz2Consequently, notes one commentator, "[d]ecisionmaken would be forced to compensate for
underlying social inequalities that they did not create."123
119. Id. at 293 n.23 (quoting CONG.GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293 (1866)).Representative Wilson also declared that the bill provided for the equality of all races in their
civil rights and immunities. Id. at 292 (quoting CONG.GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117
(1866)). See abo Proof of Purpose, supra note 2, at 740 n.74 (McDonald "held that Congress intended to enact the value of equal treatment").
120. 401 U.S. at 429-30, 434-36 & nn.10-11.
121. Id. at 432. See Disproportionate Impact, supra note 8, at 1286 & nn.111-12. Rut
see Seelman, supra note 40, at 10-69; Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALEL.J. 98, 102-06 & n.29 (1974).
122. Washington v. Davis, 426 U S . at 241 (quoting Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S.
535, 548 (1972)).
123. Proof of Purpose, supra note 2, at 738.

1054

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I978

Similar results would likely follow if the disproportionate
impact theory were applied to the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and
1870. Section 1981 and 1982 prohibitions against racial discrimination extend significantly beyond the proscriptions of the Civil
l ~ ~in some respects even outdistance
Rights Acts of the 1 9 6 0 ' ~ ,and
constitutional ~rohibiti0ns.l~~
Courts have indicated that section
1981, for example, reaches discrimination involving privately
owned recreational facilities,126medical care,127private education,I2"abor union practices,129libraries,130franchising arrangements, 131 restaurants, 132 the professions,133 religious practices, 134
transportation services,135 and voting.1 3 ~Blacks, whites, aliens,
In sum, the
and Hispanics have standing under section 1981.137
trend in recent Court decisions is to extend sections 1981and 1982
to an increasingly broad range of private associational and contractual re1ation~hips.l~~
As the Court recognized in Washington
124. See Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d a t 1347 (Wallace, J., dissenting)
("The potential scope of section 1981 is exceptionally broad, going far beyond the Title
VII realm of employment, and conceivably reaching virtually all private contractual arrangements"); note 9 supra.
125. See Expanding Scope, supra note 8, a t 422.
126. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Olzman v.
Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974); Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 143
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970); Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949).
127. United States v. Medical Soc'y, 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C. 1969).
128. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Grier v. Specialized Skills, Inc., 326
F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1971). See generally 31 ARK. L. REV.314, 323 n.59 (1977); 52
WASH.L. REV.955 (1977).
129. E.g., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478
F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
130. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
721 (1945).
131. Sud v. Import Motors Ltd., 379 F. Supp. 1064 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
132. Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752 (D. Or. 1973).
133. Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hosp., 261 F.2d 521 (4th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
134. Central Presbyterian Church v. Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894 (E.D.
Mo. 1969).
135. Baldwin v. Morgan, 251 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1958).
Ala. 1966), modified on other grounds,
136. Smith v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901 (M.D.
386 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1967).
supra note 35, $4 71.10-.50.
137. 3 A. LARSON,
138. See note 8 supra. Justice White has discussed the problems associated with
expanding the scope of $ 1981:
As the associational or contractual relationships [to which $ 1981 applies]
become more private, the pressures to hold 8 1981 inapplicable to them will
increase. Imaginative judicial construction of the word "contract" .is foreseeable;
Thirteenth Amendment limitations on Congress' power to ban "badges and
incidents of slavery" may be discovered; the doctrine of the right to association
may be bent to cover a given situation.
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. a t 212 (White, J., dissenting).
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u. Davis, use of an impact standard in these gray areas would
involve the judiciary in far-reaching decisions about a whole
range of practices "that may be more burdensome to the poor and
to the average black than to the more affluent white."13$
Some argue, however, that since the Civil Rights Acts are
remedial in nature they should be liberally interpretedi4""in
order that their beneficent objectives may be realized to the fullest extent possible."'41 But unlike titles VI, VII, and VIII, which
are subject to carefully circumscribed substantive and procedural
limitations,'" sections 1981 and 1982 have no such restrictions.
Because of the breadth of their application, sections 1981 and
1982, a t least as much as the Constitution, need the restraining
effect of a discriminatory purpose standard.I4"

E. Judicial or Legislative Resolution?
Incident to the concerns associated with the scope of sections
1981 and 1982 are the implications that application of the impact
standard to the Reconstruction Acts would have on the role of the
judiciary.'" In order to implement an impact standard in section
1981 and 1982 cases, the judiciary would be called upon in the
first place to "undertake the political task of trying to decide
139. 426 U.S. at 248 (footnote omitted) (the Court had specific reference to the effects
of applying an impact standard in constitutional cases).
140. It has been argued that "because the 1866 Act is quasi-constitutional, its interpretation need not be limited by the intent of its framers." 52 WASH.L. REV.955,961 n.23
( 1977).
supra note 82, § 72.05, a t 392 (footnote omitted). See Dispro141. 3 J. SUTHERLAND,
portionate Impact, supra note 8, a t 1284-86; Promise of Equality, supra note 13, at 326.
In his opinion in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978), Justice
Brennan argued that decisions construing title VII and other civil rights statutes "are
indicative of the Court's unwillingness to construe remedial statutes designed to eliminate
discrimination against racial minorities in a manner which would impede efforts to obtain
this objective." id. a t 2781 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting).
142. See 42 U.S.C. $4 2000d to 2000f (1976); note 9 supra.
As Judge Wallace pointed out in his dissent to Davis v. County of Los Angeles,
"[blecause these barriers [to title VII] tend to eliminate claims that are frivolous or
suffering from obvious legal or factual. defects, it-is not unreasonable to provide that a
prima facie case may be established without a showing of discriminatory intent." 566 F.2d
a t 1350 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
143. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d a t 1350 (Wallace, J., dissenting): "The
section 1981 screening mechanism, as in actions proceeding directly under the Fourteenth
Amendment, is the required demonstration of discriminatory intent."
144. See Perry, supra note 39, a t 586-88 (implementation of disproportionate impact
analysis depends on "conception of judicial function"); Burden of Proof, supra note 44,
a t 834 (discusses "the Court's traditional reluctance t o interfere with the legislative and
administrative process"); Proof of Purpose, supra note 2, a t 738-39 (Davis "was also
concerned with defining the proper role of the judiciary").
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what . . . areas are appropriate ones" for the r ~ 1 e . According
I~~
to Justice Powell, this would involve a finding "that past discrimination [in that area] had handicapped various minority groups
to such an extent that disparate impact could be traced to identifiable instances of past di~crimination?~~
The courts would then be required to define how the burden
of proof will be allocated. Requiring the invalidation of any practice that has a racially discriminatory effect under a pure impact
standard would be theoretically possible. This approach, however,
would deeply involve the judiciary in political decisionmaking,
transforming the courts into an instrument for the redistribution of societal benefits and burdens between blacks and whites.
Furthermore, the invalidation of such decisions would often be
a remedy disproportionate to the decisionmaker's wrongful act,
since the decisionmaker presumably was acting in a raceneutral manner against a background of societal inequality he
did not create.IJ7

Recognizing the difficulties involved in this approach, commentators have attempted to define schemes for limiting the scope of
the impact rule in section 1981 cases.'4nBecause of the sensitive
balancing required, however, the courts have generally deferred
such policy determinations to the executive and legislative departments. As Justice Powell explained, disparate impact alone
is not sufficient to establish a statutory violation. In the case of
title VII, he pointed out, Congress determined that "disparate
impact is a basis for relief . . . only if the practice in question is
not founded on 'business necessity' . . . or lacks 'a manifest relationship to the employment in question."'149Judicially reading
the impact theory into sections 1981 and 1982 without the kinds
of legislative or administrative guidelines that are present in the
case of title VII would, in the words of Justice White, require
courts "to balance sensitive policy considerations against each
other-considerations which have never been addressed by any
Congress-all under the guise of 'construing' a statute. This is a
145. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. at 212 (White, J., dissenting) (Justice White used
this argument to oppose the extension of 8 1981 to private acts of discrimination).
146. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2758 n.44 (1978).
147. Proof of Purpose, supra note 2, at 738-39 (footnote omitted).
148. Expanding Scope, supra note 8, at 430-32; Note, Section 1981 and Private
Groups: The Right to Discriminate Versus Freedom from Discrimination, 84 YALEL.J.
1441, 1471-76 (1975).
149. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2758 n.44 (1978) (citations
omitted).
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task appropriate for the Legislature, not for the Judiciary."lL"
Legislative resolution of these issues implies that the judiciary will not "be the leader in the nation's drive for racial equality."15' It should not mean, however, that the disproportionate
impact standard could never be used in race discrimination actions brought under the Reconstruction Acts. It may be advisable
for the Legislature to extend the standard to the earlier statutes.
But although legislative resolution of the problem may meet the
demands of "equality" less promptly than would a judicial solution, the long term gains that would accrue by insisting that
Congress rather than the courts extend the scope of sections 1981
and 1982 may far outweigh the cost of the delay.'" For as Chief
Justice Burger explained, society also has a keen interest in the
separation of powers: "While '[it] is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,' . . .
it is equally-and emphatically-the exclusive province of the
Congress not only to formulate legislative policies . . . but also
to establish their relative priority for the Nation."lX:'Construing
sections 1981 and 1982 consistently with the fourteenth amendment would not only preserve the integrity of our constitutional
150. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. a t 212 (White, J., dissenting) (Justice White used
this argument to oppose the extension of § 1981 t o private acts of discrimination). Justice
Powell has implied that application of the impact standard to other civil rights measures
would require the kind of legislative mandate that existed in the case of title VII. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2758 n.44 (1978).
151. Proof of Purpose, supra note 2, a t 739 (footnote omitted). See Perry, supra note
39, a t 588 & n.202. See also Brest, supra note 1, a t 53.
152. Many commentators have addressed the question of the institutional costs involved when courts become enmeshed in political decisionmaking. See, e.g., R. BERGER,
supra note 94, a t 409-12; D. HOROWITZ,
supra note 105, a t 17-21, 255-98; Kurland, supra
note 105. See generally P. KURLAND,
POLITICS,
THE CONSTITUTION,
AND THE WARREN
COURT
64,?1 (1978);
(1970); Glazer, Should Judges Administer Social Services?, 50 PUB.INTEREST
Kurland, Government by Judiciary, 20 MOD.AGE358 (1976).
153. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 2301 (1978) (citation omitted)
(alteration by the Court) (quoting Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)). The Chief
Justice also quoted the following passage from Robert Bolt's A Man for All Seasons to
illustrate his feelings about the serious consequences that attend judicial encroachment
on legislative functions:
"The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal, not what's right. And I'll stick
to what's legal . . . . I'm not God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong,
which you find such plain-sailing, I can't navigate, I'm no voyager. But in the
thickets of the law, oh there I'm a forester. . . . What would you do? Cut a great
road through the law to get after the Devil? . . And when the last law was
down, and the Devil turned round on you-where would you hide, Roper, the
laws all being flat? This country's planted thick with laws from coast to
coast-Man's laws, not God's-and if you cut them down . . . d'you really think
you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd give the
Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake."
Id. a t 2302 (quoting R. BOLT,A MANFOR ALLSEASONS
147 (Heinemann ed. 1967)).

.

1058

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I978

system by deferring important policy decisions to the legislature,
but would strengthen the legitimacy of the judicial process by
extricating the courts from the "political task of trying to decide"154 how societal benefits and burdens should be distributed
between blacks and whites.

IV. CONCLUSION
The division in the lower courts on the issue of the standard
of proof required in section 1981 and 1982 race discrimination
cases involving facially neutral practices reflects the uncertainty
that exists in the federal judiciary as to the direction discrimination law should take after Washington v. Davis. While some express concern about the restrictive impact the Davis rationale
would have on race discrimination law if applied to section 1981
and 1982 actions, others rely on indications by the Supreme Court
that major policy changes would better be made by the Congress.
The disproportionate impact theory can be a powerful tool in the
continuing struggle to assure all disadvantaged peoples "equal
rights under the law." The sensitive balancing of interests required in the areas affected by sections 1981 and 1982, however,
requires the authoritative mandate offered by a Congressional
imprimatur. In an era when concern about the limits of judicial
power is increasing, emphasis on legislative history and deference
to legislative intent is appropriate. As the Chief Justice has vigorously asserted:
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a
particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be
put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the
meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality
determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit
as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of
veto. Is5

Stephen L. Fluckiger
-

154. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U S . at 212 (White, J., dissenting).
155. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 2303 (1978).

